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companybrief
Wisdom of Salomon 
Courts rarely lift the veil between a company and its owners and directors, whatever the
justice of the case. James Mendelsohn outlines when limited exceptions to the rule are made
treated as one, and therefore the
parent should receive compensation. 
However, DHN was questioned in
the similar case of Woolfson v
Strathclyde Regional Council [1978]
SLT 159 (HL), and also in Ord.
Although DHN has never been
formally overruled, only brave lawyers
will now cite it. 
Sham exception
This was the third argument used,
unsuccessfully, by Adams. Elsewhere,
however, the courts have lifted the veil
where the company has been used as
a ‘sham’ to evade prior obligations. 
In Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch
935 (CA), Horne was employed by Gilford.
He covenanted not to solicit Gilford’s
customers upon leaving. He left Gilford and
set up a limited company which operated a
similar business. The new company solicited
Gilford’s customers. Gilford sued for breach
of covenant. 
The court awarded an injunction against
both Horne and his company, which was
described as ‘a device, a stratagem… a cloak
or a sham, to engage in business… in respect
of which… the plaintiffs might object’. In
Trustor AB v Smallbone (No2) [2001] All ER
987, judgment was made both against a
director who had misappropriated Trustor’s
funds, and against the separate company –
the ‘façade’ – to which he had made
unauthorised payments. 
Elsewhere, the usual rule prevails, even if
the court is vaguely sympathetic. In Re Lewis’s
Will Trusts [1984] 3 All ER 930, Lewis
transferred his farm to a company in which
he held a 75% shareholding. In his will he
purported to leave the farm to his son. The
will failed, as at his death the farm was not
his to bequeath. 
Salomon outlines that there is a ‘veil’
between a company and its members. This
veil will only be lifted (i) where statute so
requires; or (ii) where one of the categories in
Cape applies, particularly where the court
considers the company to be a ‘sham’.
Otherwise, the general rule will prevail. 
James Mendelsohn teaches company law at
the University of Huddersfield
A COMPANY IS a separate legal
entity, distinct from its shareholders
and directors. Shareholders are not
liable for a company’s debts, only for
unpaid amounts on their shares.
In Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd
[1897] AC 22 (HL), Aaron Salomon
held 20,001 of 20,007 shares in the
company and was the sole director.
Nevertheless, the court refused to ‘lift
the veil’ between the company and
Salomon – he was not personally
liable to the insolvent company’s
creditors. Similarly, holding companies
are not liable for the debts of
subsidiaries, nor are companies within
the same group liable for each others’ debts
(The Albazero [1977] AC 774).
This principle sometimes appears perverse.
In Creasey v Breachwood Motors [1992] BCC
638, two companies had identical directors
and shareholders. Company A’s assets were
deliberately transferred to company B, leaving
Creasey with a worthless judgment against
company A, his former employer. 
The judge substituted company B as
defendant. Although seemingly fair and
practical, Creasey was overruled in Ord v
Belhaven Pubs [1998] 2 BCLC 447 (CA), a
case with similar facts. Statute and the courts
only lift the veil in exceptional circumstances,
not merely because ‘justice so requires’. 
Enemy state 
The Trading with the Enemy Act 1939
criminalises wartime trade with the ‘enemy’.
The definition of ‘enemy’ includes an English-
registered company controlled by citizens of an
enemy state. This erodes the usual distinction
between a company and its members or
directors. Such statutory exceptions are rare.
So too are cases where the courts lift the veil.
These are categorised in Adams v Cape
Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA).
Cape Industries plc was an English-
registered holding company, with Texan
subsidiaries. Adams won judgments in 
Texas against one of Cape’s subsidiaries, 
and sought to enforce these judgments
against Cape, the holding company, in
England. Affirming Salomon, the court
distinguished the holding company from its
subsidiaries. 
Lifting the
veil: courts
will be
reluctant to
look behind
a company
The court said that the judgments would
only be enforced in England if Adams could
show that Cape (as opposed to its
subsidiaries) was ‘present’ in Texas, and that
Cape’s business (as opposed to the business
of its subsidiaries) was conducted there.
Adams advanced three arguments which,
although unsuccessful in Cape itself,
nevertheless usefully group the cases where
the courts have lifted the veil. 
Adams argued, unsuccessfully, that the
Texan companies were agents for Cape,
which should therefore be made liable for
their debts. In contrast, in Smith Stone &
Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939]
4 All ER 116, the parent company and its
directors held all the shares in the subsidiary.
The subsidiary’s profits were treated as the
parent’s profits; the subsidiary had no real
independent existence. The court found an
agency relationship between parent and
subsidiary and lifted the veil. The particular
facts in each case will determine whether
such a relationship exists. 
Adams also argued, unsuccessfully, that
Cape and its subsidiaries were really one
economic unit. This argument derived from
DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough
of Tower Hamlets [1976] 1 WLR 852 (CA). 
A parent company operated from premises
owned by its subsidiary. Following
compulsory purchase of these premises by
the council, the parent’s business folded. 
In order to claim compensation, the parent
company had to show that it (as opposed to
its subsidiary) owned the premises. The court
held that the parent and subsidiary should be
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